UncategorizedThe latest POSH judicial pronouncements which IC’s must keep in mind

                                                            POSH UPDATE – JULY 2026

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CASE 1- Siddhesh Pradeep Satpute v. State Bank of India & Ors.

Bombay High Court | Division Bench (Justice Suman Shyam & Justice Firdosh P. Pooniwalla) |        16 June 2026 | WP No. 1213 of 2024 | Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:13187-DB

Facts

A male SBI employee (accused petitioner) commuted daily from Navi Mumbai to BKC by local train, then shared an autorickshaw from Kurla to his office.

On 24 March 2023, a female chef (Complainant) employed at another company was seated beside him in the same autorickshaw. She alleged he inappropriately touched her chest. She pepper-sprayed him, stopped the vehicle, and filed an FIR under Section 354A IPC. She then complained to the ICC of her employer, which forwarded it to the ICC of his employer- the State Bank of India.

SBI’s ICC found him guilty on 29 August 2023 and recommended disciplinary action.

The accused challenged the SBI ICC’s order before the Bombay HC on a single ground: the ICC had no jurisdiction because the incident did not occur at a “workplace” under the POSH Act

The Statutory Hook

Section 2(o)(v) of the POSH Act expands “workplace” to include:

any place visited by the employee arising out of or during the course of employment, including transportation by the employer for undertaking such journey.

The respondent (SBI) argued the ICC could entertain the complaint first and determine the “workplace” question as a factual inquiry thereafter

Held:

1. Jurisdiction is a threshold question, not a merits question.
   The ICC must first determine whether the alleged harassment occurred at a “workplace.” Only if that is answered affirmatively does jurisdiction to inquire on merits arise. The ICC cannot bootstrap jurisdiction by entertaining a complaint and treating the threshold question as just another factual issue.
2. The phrase “by the employer” in Section 2(o)(v) is a statutory condition precedent, not ornamental.
   Transportation is brought within “workplace” only when the employer provides it.

A shared public autorickshaw, used independently by both parties on their personal commute, is categorically outside this definition regardless of the fact that both parties were on their way to/from work.

3. The ICC’s order was without jurisdiction and was quashed.
   Since the auto-rickshaw was not provided by SBI or the Complainant’s employer, the incident did not occur at a “workplace” under the Act. The entire inquiry was held to be void ab initio. The Bombay High Court quashed the findings of an ICC on the ground of pure lack of jurisdiction, holding that transportation not provided by the employer cannot fall within the statutory definition of “workplace.” The ruling also establishes that jurisdiction is a threshold issue that must be determined before any inquiry into the merits of a complaint can proceed.
4. Merits expressly left open.
   The Court was explicit that it was not adjudicating whether harassment actually occurred. That question remains open for any appropriate proceeding (criminal, civil, etc.) outside the POSH framework.

Significance

This ruling draws a hard line that practitioners need to internalize: the POSH Act’s geographical reach is employer-controlled space, not the entirety of an employee’s working day. The expansive definition of workplace, which includes client offices, conference venues, off-site visits, does not swallow commuting in public transport.

The crucial variable is always: who arranged the transport? If the answer is the employee themselves using a public or private vehicle of their own choosing, POSH jurisdiction simply does not attach.

CASE 2- Prof. Rasal Singh v. University of Delhi & Ors.

Delhi High Court | 24 April, 2026 I Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav | W.P.(C) 14760/2025

Facts

Between March and April 2025, three Assistant Professors at Ramanujan College (University of Delhi affiliate) filed formal complaints against the College Principal, Prof. Rasal Singh, alleging sexual harassment and professional misconduct.

Instead of referring the matter directly to the ICC, the Deputy Registrar (Colleges), DU, constituted an ad hoc fact-finding committee on 5 May 2025 to preliminarily examine the complaints. This committee submitted a report concluding that Prof. Singh had created an environment of fear and intimidation, and that the allegations potentially constituted sexual harassment then recommended referring the matter to the ICC.

Based on this ad hoc report, and with the Vice-Chancellor’s approval, the College’s Governing Body passed a suspension order on 18 September 2025 using the phrase “serious misconduct and harassment” and citing the “gravity of the matter.”

Prof. Singh challenged the suspension order in the Delhi HC on two grounds: (1) the ad hoc committee was illegal; and (2) the suspension order was stigmatic.

Issues Before the Court

1. Can an employer suspend an employee in a POSH matter, given that Section 12 of the Act (interim relief) does not explicitly mention suspension?
2. Is it permissible to constitute a pre-ICC ad hoc fact-finding committee when a POSH complaint is received?
3. Was the specific language of the suspension order unlawfully stigmatic?

Held:

a.     Does the power to suspend by the management survive? Yes.
Note: Section 12 of the POSH Act lists interim measures (transfer, leave, etc.) but does not mention suspension.

The respondents argued this silence means employers retain inherent power. The Court agreed. Section 28 of the Act expressly states that the Act operates in addition to, and not in derogation of other laws. Relying on R.P. Kapur v. Union of India and Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that standard service rules survive alongside POSH and an employer’s inherent suspension power is not extinguished.

1. The ad hoc committee was ‘Illegal’, full stop.
   The Court held the pre-ICC fact-finding committee to be entirely de hors the POSH Act. The Act is a comprehensive, self-contained code with a mandatory procedural pathway: complaints go to the ICC, period.

A parallel ad hoc committee:

• lacks any statutory basis;
• delays justice and slows the time-bound resolution the Act demands;
• forces victims to recount sensitive trauma in unspecialized, unauthorized settings;
• violates the procedural exclusivity the Supreme Court had affirmed in both Sohail Malik and Aureliano Fernandes.

The preliminary fact finding by the ad hoc committee’s report was therefore legally worthless and any action founded on it was tainted from inception.

Why was the stigmatic suspension order quashed?
This is the sharpest finding. A suspension order is an interim administrative measure, not a punishment. Its language must be neutral such as “you are suspended pending inquiry”.

The impugned suspension order went further as it characterized the conduct as “serious misconduct and harassment” and highlighted the “gravity of the matter.” The Court held this destroyed the presumption of innocence and any reader of the order would form a prejudicial opinion before the ICC had examined a single piece of evidence. That renders the order unconstitutional, not just procedurally defective.

Relief:
Suspension order of 18 September 2025 set aside and quashed. However, the Governing Body was granted liberty to issue a fresh suspension order — one framed in neutral administrative language and not premised on the illegal ad hoc committee’s report.

Three clear rules emerge from this judgment that every employer and ICC member must internalize:

1. First, when a POSH complaint lands, it MUST GO DIRECTLY to the ICC. There is no legally permissible “preliminary screening committee” step, regardless of how administratively convenient that may seem.
2. Second, an employer can suspend a respondent during POSH proceedings under service rules, but the order must read like an administrative act, not a verdict.
3. Third, building any action including interim measures on the foundation of an unauthorized parallel inquiry is enough to invalidate that action entirely.

 

CASE 3- Nashik Case | Bail Application No. 707 of 2026 | Additional Sessions Court, Nashik /Ashwini Ashok Chainani v. State of Maharashtra| May 15, 2026

ICC Member’s inaction led to the rejection of Bail application.

Facts:

A female Associate at a Nashik BPO alleged sustained harassment by her team leader and male colleagues, such as unwanted interactions, personal questions, staring, sexually coloured remarks, and rumour-spreading that created a hostile environment.

The Complainant further alleged that despite repeatedly expressing discomfort and orally reporting the incidents to supervisory personnel, no effective action was taken. She claimed that rumours about her personal life were spread in the office and that she was subjected to continued embarrassment and a hostile work environment.

Chainani was a senior TCS official ,head (delivery partner) and an IC member. She was arrested under Crime No. 163 of 2026 and sought bail under Section 483 BNSS.

The allegations against her: A Complainant who had orally reported harassment to Chainani alleged that instead of routing the complaint to the IC, Chainani discouraged her from pursuing it, took no formal steps to register or escalate it, and effectively told her to let it go. The Complainant alleged that this inaction enabled the accused persons to continue their conduct. Ultimately, feeling unsupported and distressed by the workplace environment, she resigned from her employment and lodged a criminal complaint, leading to the registration of the FIR.

Prosecution’s argument: Inaction by an IC member who had knowledge of ongoing harassment and actively suppressed the formal complaint channel amounts to abetment by omission under the BNS. She also held positional authority capable of influencing witnesses.

Defence argument: Chainani was based in Pune, not Nashik; she was not involved in day-to-day operations of the Nashik office; there was no written complaint against her; and similarly placed officials had not been made accused.

Court’s ruling — Bail rejected. While refusing bail, the court made strong observations against the applicant, stating that despite being part of the Internal Committee, she demonstrated “insensitivity” towards the victim’s complaints and effectively shielded the accused. The court held that reference can be made to the proviso of section 9 of, “The sexual harassment of women at work place (Prevention, prohibition and redressal) Act, 2013 which prescribes that where such complaint cannot be made in writing, the Presiding Officer or any member of the Internal Committee etc. as the case may be, shall render all reasonable assistance to the women for making the complaint in writing”. The facts of the case would rather reveal that the applicant being the member of the Internal Committee did not render her assistance to the victim for making the complaint in writing as mandated by the provisions of said act. On the contrary the act of the applicant would reveal that she had blamed the informant for being in highlight and ask her to let go the accused.

The court remarked that “Chainani did not prevent the co-accused by taking appropriate action against them and waited till the crisis occurred. Her silence and insensitivity had endorsed the acts of the accused. She turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to what was happening in front of her,”

Held: Bail rejected. The Court held that an ICC member occupies a position of specific statutory responsibility and it’s not a passive administrative role. The accusation was not mere inaction but potential abetment: actively discouraging the Complainant from pursuing the matter, thereby enabling ongoing harassment. Since the investigation was ongoing and witnesses could be influenced a live risk, the court rejected the bail application.

Why it matters: This is the first instance where a court has treated an ICC member’s deliberate suppression of a complaint as potentially criminal abetment, not just a compliance lapse.

ICC membership now carries personal legal exposure.

CASE 4- Prof. (Dr.) J. Sundaresan Pillai v. IRTC | Kerala High Court | 6 January 2026

ICC has Jurisdiction to investigate a complaint against a ‘Director’ who falls within the category of an Employee, and he is not an Employer.

Facts: Prof. Pillai, a retired CSIR scientist serving as Director of the Integrated Rural Technology Centre (IRTC), Kerala, was accused of sexual harassment by a woman employee. He challenged ICC jurisdiction, arguing that as Director he was the “employer” under Section 2(g) of POSH. It was submitted that the POSH complaint should be investigated by the Local Committee (LC), not the ICC (which cannot inquire into complaints against its own employer).

Held: The jurisdiction of the ICC upheld. The Court held that a Director of an institution cannot automatically be treated as an “employer” under Section 2(g), POSH Act merely because he exercises managerial or administrative functions. Where the institution’s Memorandum of Association and governing rules show that the ultimate control, administration and supervision of the organisation vest with the General Body and Executive Committee, and the Director functions subject to their authority and is appointed by them, the Director would fall within the definition of an “employee” under Section 2(f) of the Act

The Director was appointed by, and functioned under the supervision of, the Executive Committee. He therefore could not be the “employer” under POSH. He was correctly classified as an employee, and the ICC had full jurisdiction to enquire into the matter.

Why it matters: The judgement establishes that senior functionaries (directors, vice-chancellors, heads of institutions) cannot escape ICC jurisdiction simply by invoking their title.

CASE 5- Conciliation bars ICC Inquiry, Not Employer Discipline

Facts: A 2022 harassment complaint at AAI’s Imphal Airport proceeded to ICC but ended in conciliation under Section 10.

The terms of the Settlement were professional distance only, but no monetary settlement was accorded. The ICC’ recorded an observation that there was lack of evidence. Post-conciliation, the Complainant submitted fresh evidence (screenshot of an objectionable message) which the ICC refused to reopen as Section 10(4) bars further inquiry after settlement.

Subsequent to that, AAI as an employer independently issued a charge sheet and initiated departmental proceedings. The respondent got those enquiry proceedings quashed by a Single Judge, who read Section 10(4) as barring all further action. AAI appealed.

Held (Division Bench):

The Single Judge’s order set was aside and it was held that Section 10(4) bars only the ICC/Local Committee from continuing its inquiry but it does not extinguish the employer’s independent disciplinary jurisdiction under service rules. The Bench noted that “the enquiry by the ICC could not be concluded because of the agreement between the parties to conciliate the matter to avoid workplace tension and disturbance.” It was also held that “So far as the impugned judgment expunging the first paragraph of the ICC conclusion, namely, ‘lack of evidence’ is concerned, the same ought not to be interfered with.”

The POSH Act establishes a minimum protective framework and does not override service rules “unless specified.” The new evidence justified departmental action, and the employer’s Section 19 duty to maintain a safe workplace remained operative.

• Conciliation under the POSH Act does not grant immunity from disciplinary action by the employer.
• ICC proceedings do not replace or override an employer’s disciplinary jurisdiction unless service rules expressly provide so.
• Employers retain a continuing obligation to ensure workplace safety, even after conciliation.
• Findings recorded in a curtailed or incomplete ICC enquiry should be treated with caution.
• The judgment strikes a balance between protecting the dignity of the Complainant and ensuring procedural fairness to the accused.

Why it matters: Conciliation is not a “get out of jail free” card for respondents. Employers retain full power to pursue disciplinary proceedings independently, particularly where fresh evidence emerges or the conduct warrants action beyond what an ICC settlement addresses.

CASE 6-Shrinivas Shinde v. Directorate of Skill Development & Entrepreneurship, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 2653, 20-04-2026

IC’s cannot shield identified instigators by terming them “UNKNOWN”

The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“POSH Act”) was enacted in India to protect women from sexual harassment at the workplace and to ensure a safe and dignified working environment. At the same time, the POSH Act is not meant to be used as a tool for victimising innocent employees. Keeping this in mind, the legislature included Section 14, which allows action to be taken against a Complainant or witness if a complaint is found to be false or malicious, subject to proper inquiry.

However, an important and unresolved legal question remains: what happens in cases where a false or malicious complaint is not made independently by the Complainant, but is instead instigated or forced by a third party?

The POSH Act does not clearly deal with such situations. While it provides consequences for a false complaint, it is silent on whether and how a person who instigates such a complaint can be held accountable under the Act. This nuanced situation came under judicial scrutiny before the Bombay High Court at Goa, giving rise to significant question whether a person who instigates a false sexual harassment complaint can be proceeded against under the POSH law?

Background

The dispute originated from a sexual harassment complaint filed by Respondent No. 4 (Complainant) on November 29, 2024 against the Petitioner, a permanent Government servant working as a Lower Division Clerk. The allegations included: that the Petitioner was harassing her on the basis of her disability; that the Petitioner did not cooperate with her and frequently passed discriminatory comments such as “go to hell” and other such remarks; that the Petitioner frequently stared at her in an unpleasant and unprofessional manner and also behaved in an aggressive and abnormal way.

Pursuant to the complaint, an Internal Committee (IC) was constituted to enquire into the matter. The Petitioner filed his reply dated January 02, 2025 denying the allegations and raised a suspicion that the complaint was made at the instigation of a third person.

A preliminary inquiry was conducted by the IC, wherein the Respondent No. 4 (Complainant) made the following admissions: that her complaint was not prepared by her; that she was unaware of the contents of the said complaint; that the Petitioner had neither sexually harassed her nor troubled her on the basis of her disability; and, most importantly, she clearly stated the complaint was prepared by the Respondent No. 3, who was the Principal of the Institute. Respondent 4 ( Complainant) further submitted that she was threatened to sign the complaint, with consequences if she refused.

These assertions were reiterated in a detailed retraction letter submitted to the IC dated 6 January 2025, wherein she withdrew all the charges of sexual harassment against the Petitioner and confirmed that she was not under any pressure to withdraw her complaint.

Findings of the IC

Relying on the retraction, the Enquiry Report dated January 10, 2025 was submitted to the Employer stating that the case was a false and malicious complaint. However, even though the Complainant had explicitly named the Principal as the instigator, the IC recorded in its report that “some unknown source” had influenced the Complainant to file the sexual harassment complaint against him, as she was an intellectually disabled person. Thus, the enquiry was closed and the penalties for the Complainant under the POSH Act were waived.

This was a deliberate and selective omission on the part of the IC. Though there was acceptance of the retraction, leading to the withdrawal of the complaint, there was erasure of the named instigator. This formed the crux of the Petitioner’s appeal.

Appeal before the Industrial Tribunal

Invoking Section 18 of the POSH Act, the Petitioner approached the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court, Government of Goa, contending that:

1. The IC had overlooked the mandate of Section 14 and closed the proceedings without recommending any action against Respondent No.3,(the Principal) who has been named as the instigator.
2. The IC failed to discharge its statutory duty to recommend action against Respondent No. 3 to the Employer for threatening the Complainant and instigating her to make the false complaint;
3. The IC erred in concluding that the perpetrator was “unknown” when in fact the Complainant had clearly named the Principal as the instigator; and therefore the IC was clearly protecting the Principal for reasons best known to it.

The Tribunal however dismissed the appeal as “non-maintainable,” holding that the Petitioner was not directly affected by the IC’s conclusion and that there was no verification of whether the Complainant was actually instigated and forced to complain by the Principal.

The Tribunal held that the Complainant is a grown-up, employed person and that no action could be initiated against the Principal under Section 14 without ascertaining the veracity of her statement. It further observed that, given her retraction, she could not be considered a truthful witness sufficient to launch prosecution against the Principal. The Tribunal also agreed that the POSH Act, being a special Act enacted to protect against sexual harassment at the workplace, cannot be used as a forum to settle scores between employees or against a superior. Since no direct injury was shown, and the Petitioner could not establish malicious intent on the Principal’s part, the mere retraction statement could not be a basis for the Tribunal to intervene in the IC’s findings. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

This dismissal was challenged by the Petitioner before the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay at Goa.

Issues before the High Court and Key Findings

The High Court considered, inter alia: whether:

1. Does the Petitioner qualify as a “person aggrieved” entitled to appeal under Section 18?
2. Has the IC committed a legal or jurisdictional error by recording the instigator as an “unknown source”; and whether disciplinary action could be directed against Respondent 3 (the Principal) under Section 14.

HELD:

Right to Appeal: The Court held that the Petitioner is clearly a person aggrieved by the IC’s recommendations and has a statutory right to appeal under the POSH Act. It is not necessary for an aggrieved person to show direct injury caused to him.

IC’s Duty of Consistency and Transparency: Hon’ble Justice Dr. Neela Gokhale found the IC’s approach fundamentally flawed. Once the IC has relied on the Complainant’s retraction to close the case, it could not selectively suppress the portion of the retraction that identified the instigator. “Having noted the contents of the retraction letter, the IC clearly failed in the discharge of its duties to specify that the complaint was being closed on account of false allegations made against the Petitioner, at the behest of the instigator,”. It further held: “The IC cannot selectively omit to name the source of instigation, when he is named in the same retraction letter.”

Limits of Section 14: The Court drew a clear statutory boundary, holding that Section 14 (punishment for false or malicious complaints) applies only to the aggrieved woman or the person who makes the complaint under Section 9. Since Respondent No. 3 (the Principal) was neither the aggrieved woman nor the person who made the complaint and he was drawn into the proceedings only pursuant to the Complainant’s retraction statement the Petitioner’s prayer to direct disciplinary action against the Principal under the POSH Act was misplaced and rejected. The Complainant remains the author of the complaint, even if she was threatened into filing it.

However, the Court expressly preserved the Petitioner’s liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings against Respondent 3, before an appropriate forum, if permissible in law. If such proceedings are initiated against Respondent 3, it is needless to say that he shall be afforded an opportunity of being heard to defend himself.

Judgment

Invoking its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court set aside the Industrial Tribunal’s order dated November 26, 2025, and corrected the IC’s findings directly instead of remanding the matter. The IC’s conclusion was modified to read: “The Respondent No. 3 (i.e., the Principal) instigated the Respondent No. 4 (i.e., the Complainant) to file a false sexual harassment case against the Petitioner.”

Conclusion

This decision is a significant reaffirmation of procedural fairness in POSH proceedings. While the Court declined to stretch Section 14 to cover third-party instigators, it firmly rejected attempts by ICs to sanitize the record by anonymising a clearly identified wrongdoer.

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